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I.

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

Professors Leech, Oliver and Sweeney have given us a masterfully simple and artistic set of teaching materials.' The work is
masterful in sustaining their view that the use of international
law in decisions always involves individuals directly, in one way
or another, in various domestic and international settings. In
purporting to be pragmatic and realistic, it is artistic because
-like all good art-it never says all it knows.
By the authors' own modest claims, the work would succeed
if it found a place mainly as a teaching tool in the context of a
modern law school curriculum. Its intellectual assumptions,
however, are not so completely instrumental. We find three important working premises of the casebook revealed in the authors' preface. First, the work uses analysis of decisions in many
different contexts to aid in understanding the international legal
system. Second, it shuns commentary laden with authoritative
citations, using cases, events, notes, and problems instead to
move inside decisions that demonstrate how principles of international law are used to make a difference in results. Third, it
assumes that speculation about, or analysis of, international law
at a theoretical level cannot take place without prior vicarious
experience of particular decisions.
The work's major objective is to get the attention of today's
law student who will in turn influence the future direction of
decisions in and about the international legal system. The means
used are pragmatic and analytic; the book is concerned mostly
with how lawyers use concepts, principles, norms, values, and
interests to affect decisions within the system.
t Dean and Professor of Law, American University. B.S. 1955, J.D. 1956, University
of Utah; S.J.D. 1961, George Washington University.
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The authors deserve high praise for the clarity with which
the organization of the book proceeds. The beginning contains a
vision of the whole; the first chapter moves rapidly through the
entire international legal system. It requires one to move inside
the system and to survey the simplest points of decision before
courts, agencies, foreign offices, and international tribunals.
The most important juridical concepts Are found in Parts I,
II, and III, roughly one-half of the entire book. These parts
deal with three distinct aspects of jurisdiction: the allocation of
competence within the international system to nation-states; the
limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction, as in the state immunity and the act of state doctrines; and the application of international standards of fairness and justice to the exercise of a
state's capacity to administer a national legal system, looking to
the consequences of applying domestic law contrary to international law.
Part IV encompasses the structure of the international legal
system, beginning with the organizational concept of statehood
and problems of recognition of states and governments. It proceeds to discuss the diplomatic and consular immunities which
protect national representatives in the orderly relations between
states, and international organizations in terms of their functions
and the use and protection of international civil servants as their
representatives. The Leech, Oliver, and Sweeney casebook is a
major departure from the tradition, represented by Hudson's
and Briggs' casebooks, that first structures the international
community conceptually through states and their existence before examining jurisdictional concepts. 2 Under the approach
of Leech, Oliver, and Sweeney, the allocation of jurisdiction
is independent of the concept of the nation-state and its administration.
Part V uses various sources of international law as guides to
decision within national systems. Only at this juncture, in Part
VI, do the authors introduce theories about the international
legal system. While the chapter is by no means adequate to cover
contemporary trends and theories about international law, it
does introduce enough speculative material for students to be
well on their way toward developing, as the authors frame it,
their own criteria for theories about international law.3
Part VII analyzes the use of self-defense, the provisions of
the United Nations Charter, the challenges to the use of force
H.

(2d ed. 1952);
ed. 1951).
REV. 362 (1971),
is of particular help in formulating criteria against which theories may be tested.
2

M.

BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS, CASES, DOCUMENTS, AND NOTES

HUDSON, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d
1 Lasswell & McDougal, Criteriafor a Theory About Law, 44 S. CALL.
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short of war, the newer means of violence such as conflicts less
than civil war, and, finally, intervention of the United Nations
under the Charter for peacekeeping purposes. the analysis of
the use of force is better understood following the chapter on
theory, especially since all other aspects of the system have been
covered by the time the most difficult questions are presented.
The practical and the theoretical collide when organized violence
becomes likely; problems in controlling the use of force are ways
of perceiving the limits of law and the beginnings of pure power.
All that precedes the final chapter is necessary for an understanding of the limits of law in controlling violence.
4
On completion of the book's highly successful first year,
and having taught a basic course twice with the materials, I
should like to interpret the work's underlying biases (as Holmes
would say, the praejudicia). My focus is on context, jurisdiction,
and the collision between economics and human rights. The authors show that public international law involves and affects individuals through judicial and official decisions in specific disputes. These disputes between individuals and among peoples
mainly arise from either an economic (scientific) or a humanistic
mode of thought. The question for jurisprudence on an international level is whether there might be a reconciliation of these
two ways of thinking.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE ART
After World War II, a most creative period of international
legal scholarship transformed the study of international law
from a field which centered on general rules governing the conduct of states in their mutual relations, to one which focused on
the policy sciences of the processes of power. Bishop, whom the
authors acknowledge as their spiritual father, began experimenting with his first set of materials at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. Hudson's cases and materials were revised,
drawing upon contemporary materials as well as upon his scholarship in the thirties. Briggs' The Law of Nations integrated law
and political science in the best of the nonlegalistic tradition.
Those who studied or taught international law in the fifties used
these materials.
Simultaneously, the secure conception of a EuropeanAmerican family of nations was increasingly being shaken by
Kelsen's insistence on purity in distinguishing the subjective
qualities of justice from the positive legal order. 5 Even more
'See Book Review, 15 HARV. INT'L L.J. 187 (1974); Book Review, 68 AM.J. INT'L L.
776 (1974).
5 H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1952).
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penetrating was the impact of McDougal's comprehensive
policy-oriented attacks on the comfortable image of a family of
nations with rules, which rules neither clarified global perspectives nor clearly stated an explicit set of international assumptions about law adequate to a rapidly changing world. 6 Jessup's
works more simply said the same thing to us: that transnational
forces were pulling away from nationalism; 7 nation-states would
need to cooperate.
The rise of the Third World and super powers, the spread
of science and technology, and the increase of complex violence
presented onerous problems for international law. New scholars
such as Falk, Lilich, Weston, Franck, and Fatouros sought
broader sources and experience for claims to an adequate conception of the international legal order. Friedmann, Lissitzyn
and Pugh incorporated much of this experience in a new,
thoroughly annotated casebook in 1969,8 building a theme of
international cooperation for international welfare, by using
general principles of law adopted by civilized nations. Ominously, the humane reasonableness of Friedmann ended with
his violent death on the streets not far from Columbia University. No amount of philosophizing about the nature and
sources of international law could resurrect the departed image
of a secure family.
Bishop's 1971 edition of his casebook 9 reiterated his limited
claims for the central position of law in international affairs. In
taking this stance, he continued an American perspective of the
practical lawyer. Appearing in turbulent times, its tone of restraint was in sharp contrast to Friedmann's more ambitious
proposals for international welfare through international cooperation. The central questions continued to revolve around
whether the international legal system could be rationalized into
a humane unity. Could autonomous principles extracted from
state practice, custom, and agreement maintain their coherence
when directly applied to individuals to replace nationalism and
yet contain forces unleashed by the breakdown of old customs,
old regimes, old myths, and old tribal perspectives?
This question seemed to be answered in the negative as a
6 McDougal, Some Basic Theoretical Concepts About InternationalLau,: A Policy-Oriented

Framework ofInquiry, IVJ. CONFLICT RES. 337 (1960); McDougal & Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1959).
P. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS (1948); TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956); THE

USE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1959).
8 W. FRIEDMANN, 0. LISSITZYN & R. PUGH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1969).
9
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resurgent nationalism reflected a new attempt at reallocating
primary and secondary resources. The poorer nation-states
sought international welfare when they no longer could satisfy
the needs of their people. The formerly legitimate exercise of
coercive force by the powerful states was challenged and held
hostage to vital resources controlled by states theretofore less
powerful. The comfortable doctrines of international law as the
means by which international relations were to be regulated
seemed obsolete.
Cynicism about the study of international law increased as
realism in international law turned into the exaltation of raw
power. Plans for comprehensive human dignity and pure normative logic were dismissed as too obscure. Forceful attempts to
pursue an unenlightened self-interest led to a suspicion that
there was no international legal system strong enough to transform a formal "rule of law" into realized international welfare
through cooperation. The need for international law as a unifying force could not be met by decentralized measures of selfhelp. Jurisprudential questions and policy alternatives both
seemed in disarray.
Concern finally shifted to necessity, to the possible, to practical models, to the iminediate needs in particular systems. Patterns of order were sought in which particular decisions on concrete disputes could be effected through domestic courts and
internal discipline. Cases and Materials on the International Legal
System appears in the midst of such upheavals, showing how national and international institutions apply international law to
disputes as they are brought by public and private individuals.
As the casebook catches us up with a real world, just as the
American legal realists did in other law subjects, it chides us for
having accepted a comfortable conception of the international
system which is simply not adequate. It tells us that we need
better answers to the ravages and injustices among peoples of
the world. Rather than an improved conception of the system,
we need new ways of seeing and thinking.
In banishing the theoretical writings on the nature of international law from their traditional prominence in casebooks at
the beginning to a short chapter near the end of the book, the
authors create a structure in which new ways of seeing and
thinking will be fostered. Creative thinking about international
law must be freed from ties to the notion of a European "family
of nations" into whose secure embrace other peoples may be
initiated if they follow club rules. The old view does not correspond to the present world. By replacing the traditional beginning with an introduction to the system for decisionmaking, the
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authors increase the need for intellect and craft. The demands
on students increase because the authors remove the convenient
theoretical crutches for a conclusion that international law does
not exist.
The result is an analysis of a variety of contemporary legal
events. The study of custom, practice, writing, and agreements is
implicitly a part of a larger study of problems of decision. A
serious student faced with such concrete issues cannot easily
dismiss the international legal process, which now becomes alive
with importance and as difficult to master as contemporary law
from a national perspective. The requirements of understanding
a global system become equally rigorous and practical.
The legal events which the authors use from many perspectives and contexts illustrate this process. Most familiar casebooks
study the coherence of rules and their relation to power. The
present work examines how principles of international law applied in the context of decision in many different human institutions may conflict in result but still achieve a unifying process. As
Karl Friedrich has explained, the lost unity of natural law reappears in the unity of process, but not necessarily in uniform
patterns of general principles of justice, custom and practice.10
Does this unity of process reflect the realities of global conflict,
or is it a mythical construct aimed at psychic security? The impasse quickly develops even if unity is sought in a system rather
than in rules. All this worry is artfully suspended in the book,
however, until after the variety of legal events is presented
for analysis. The separation of subjective preferences of right
from objective norms and the collision of rules or doctrine with
behavioral science are also suspended, pending a better understanding of the legal system proposed for study. In the meantime, the materials are rich in paradox and dilemma, for international law has to be worked out in context, decision by decision.
By postponing theory, we learn not to take the irrational
conflicts too seriously, although we realize that clarity about assumptions is required later if not sooner. Moreover, psychological interpretations of effective law, as in Scandinavian legal
realism, especially that of Ross and Langstedt, show how the
irrational in law is brought home to human beings through effective decisions and not just through rules." The casebook is
sprinkled interestingly with references to psychological consider10
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ations, which lead to deeper waters where newer interpretations
of behavior might be integrated in decision. For example,
Ehrenzweig's Psychoanalytic Jurisprudence, which has received
scant attention in international legal literature,12 explains the
natural law-positive law conflict in Freudian and post-Freudian
terms. 13 Behaviorists such as Barkun and Gould, seek explanations in experimental social sciences, 1 4 more reminiscent of
Lasswell's methodology. Fascinating adventures though they may
be, if we began with these behavioral theories, quarrels would
begin and we should never get to see the system as a whole. The
skeptical student could easily mistake serious intellectual effort
for meaningless banter confirming what was suspected all
along-that international law has no concrete reality, that it is
only therapy for power.
The authors have simply and convincingly avoided that dilemma by forcing us to agonize for our own explanations. They
naturally have hedged their bets with a short chapter on theories
ending with McDougal's framework for a configurative or
policy-oriented jurisprudence. '5 Despite their modest disclaimers
about theory, the authors surely have not relegated theory to a
secondary posture; they have imbedded theory in the structure
of their materials. While they do not say so, I should think they
would agree with 6 Holmes and Llewellyn that more, not less,
theory is needed.'
The theoretical significance of the work dwells in what is not
said about assumptions-the implicit freeing of inquiry from the
dogmas of schools of intellectual thought, but without denying
value to any of them. We are freed from the laborious initial task
of tracing the religious transcendence of natural law and the
autonomy of rules protected by the positive power of the secular
state. We are given chance to infuse newer, more creative ideas
on world order. We are permitted to consider that international
law is not locked into the policy-sciences, behaviorism, or pure
norm. Drawing on the book's structure for analysis and on other
creative powers, we may seek a way of perceiving, thinking, and
Lasswell did a brief review in 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 145 (1974).
A. EHRENZWEIG, PSYCHOANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE 185-94 (1971).

12 Harold
13

14 W. GOULD & M. BARKUN,

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

(1970).

This excellent work seeks theory in the findings available from experimental social scientists in the international law area. The authors do not mention this work or its literature.
15 The authors use McDougal's Hague lectures for theory, while his later work on
criteria for a configurative jurisprudence is not mentioned.
"6"We have too little theory in the law rather than too much." Holmes, The Path of
the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 476 (1907). See Llewellyn's lecture on theory, in W.
TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 512 (1973).
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acting in a world whose reality corresponds closely to its actual
legal system.
III.

THE DISCUSSION OF JURISDICTION

A. A General View
The importance given to jurisdiction-the power to act in
relation to certain people, things, events, or places-is basic to all
else in the book. Analytically, the concepts and limitations of
jurisdiction are simple: are the power and interests of the state
sufficiently related to the ends sought to prevail over interests of
other states? Is the connection sufficient to make rules, and to
enforce those rules once prescribed? The treatment of jurisdiction provides a juridical basis for decision by implying that the
international legal system permits limiting prescriptive power
through limiting the enforceability of decisions. 17 The casebook
and the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law' 8 both view
jurisdiction from the same analytic structure. The jural definition adopted by each work is identical: jurisdiction as a function
of power is the allocation of competence to prescribe or to enforce rules regulating the conduct of persons, places, events and
things. The authors note that the Restatement's work was lex lata,
while the casebook is more speculative.
From this starting point, the two works diverge in form, but
not substance. The Restatement uses its definition as a tool to
analyze the different bases of jurisdiction, in particular:
territory, 19 nationality, 20 and the protection of interests. 2 1 The
17 If the antitrust laws of the United States are to be enforced, to give a well-used
example, what limits are there to breaking up conglomerates in other countries controlled by corporations also doing business in the United States? If the foreign corporations are too remotely connected to a base of power exercised in the antitrust laws, the
system will act to place limits on state action even if there may well be economic effects of a minor nature. There are other equally interesting conflicts in jurisdiction explored in the book, but only after considerable attention' is given to the analytic concepts of jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to enforce through national systems.
18 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (1965) [hereinafter cited as

RESTATEMENT]. The Restatement takes care to clarify the meanings of jurisdiction as used
differently in conflict of laws and international law-two highly related legal areas. In
conflicts, jurisdiction presents the issue "whether the application of the law of the state in
creating or affecting legal interests is reasonable, so as to result in recognition of such
application in cases involving suits on its judgments in other states or raising questions in
choice of law." RESTATEMENT, supra, Introductory Note §§ 6-93, at 19. The casebook, on
the other hand, clarifies a distinction which is apt to be bothersome to a law studentdistinguishing the meaning of jurisdiction between the national legal system and the
international legal system. LEECH, OLIVER, & SWEENEY 109-10.
1" RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, §§ 11-25.
20

1d. §§ 26-32.
§§ 33-36. The Restatement divides the protections basis into two areas: the

21 Id.
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casebook focuses upon understanding the component parts of
jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to enforce, and treats
the bases of jurisdiction separately within each function.2 2
The authors begin with an analysis of the territorial basis of
jurisdiction to prescribe, 23 and develop as sub-bases conduct
within the territory which has effect outside of it, 24
and conduct
outside the territory but causing an effect within it.
As an example of the latter sub-base, the authors use the
famous Cutting case, 25 in which Mexico attempted to enforce its
libel laws against defamatory statements aimed at a Mexican national and published and circulated in the United States. The
Restatement treats this case as an attempt by a state to prescribe
laws with respect to injuries to its citizen from outside the territory, the so called "passive personality" principle. 26 In reality,
these are two ways of communicating the same idea: Whatever
the fictional base for the assertion of jurisdiction may be, such an
assertion always requires a close connection to a state interest,
and is tested against the conflicting interests of another state. On
the question whether the international system allocates jurisdiction first by reference to authority or first by limitations on
power, the familiar case of the S.S. Lotus 27 fits the authors' structure for handling jurisdictional concepts of statehood. The
Cutting and Lotus cases, both old friends, are needed for the
transition to better ways of thinking. Whether international law
only limits, or must also authorize, a state's assertion of jurisdiction is not as important to the authors as the fact patterns showing a relationship to persons, things, and events.
The principle of jurisdiction to prescribe rules to protect
state security or governmental functions is obviously developing
into a substantial base for jurisdiction, even though the acts may
take place outside the national territory. United States v.
protective principle as regards state interests and protection of certain universal interests
such as piracy, collision, and salvage on the high seas, and fisheries conservation.
22 LEECH, OLIVER, & SWEENEY 109-305. Within the jurisdiction to prescribe, the following bases are treated: conduct within the territory, conduct outside the territory
causing effect within, and conduct affecting governmental interests. Within the enforcement function of jurisdiction: dependence of jurisdiction to enforce upon jurisdiction to
prescribe and the territorial character of jurisdiction to enforce.
23 Cases cited are J.H.G. v. Pulbic Prosecutor, 26 INT'L L. REP. 158 (1963) (Ct. App.

Arnhem, Netherlands 1958); Re Penati [1946) Ann. Dig. 74 (No. 30) (Court of Cassation,
Italy).
24 LEECH, OLIVER, & SWEENEY 116-32.
25 Letter, Secretary of State to United States Ambassador to Mexico, [1887] FOREIGN

REL U.S. 751 (1888); Report on Extraterritorial Crime and the Cutting Case, id. 757;
2 J. MOORE, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 228 (1906).
26 RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, comment e, at 88.
27 [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9.
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Rodriguez28 is cited to show that this protective principle applies
when an alien makes false statements outside the United States
while applying for immigration. The authors use the case to
show the use of the fiction of territorial effects.
By substantially adopting the Restatement's approach, they
subscribe to the view that jurisdiction to enforce rules of law
depends upon jurisdiction to prescribe.2 9 Such dependency is
traced in all the bases of jurisdiction except territory. The territorial character of jurisdiction to enforce, being the most important of the enforcement bases, is separately treated in its own
subchapter.30
The decision to adopt the Restatement's analysis may have
created additional problems about fictions and their use, but it
has shown that prescribing rules and enforcing them are at the
heart of how the system allocates the power to decide. While
lawmaking activities through international conferences and
agreements may create international regimes, the exercise of
power to make such regimes effective will be through the institutions and agencies of nation-states for some time to come. As
jurisdictional claims are based less on the fictions of territory and
nationality and more on functions expected of states (including
state interest), the affirmative actions of states in promoting
goals of economic and social welfare will lead to a wider range of
legitimate conflicts between states at the jurisdictional level; the
domestic courts of several nation-states may be inclined to sit in
judgment. The system must then be able to provide principles by
which nation-states may either limit the exercise of jurisdiction
or refer certain disputes to the political process which is better
suited than the courts to balancing legitimate state interests in
conflict. In this context, the chapters on jurisdictional immunities and acts of state become a key component of the authors' proposed process of decision.
B. Sovereign Immunity and the Act of State Doctrine
The law of sovereign immunity and the act of state doctrine
each properly have a separate chapter. In each, the central problem is who within the domestic system decides whether another
state or its property is immune from jurisdiction. United States
law and practice provides much working material, but comparable problems in other countries are also explored.
2s 182 F. Supp. 479 (S.D. Cal. 1960), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Rocha v. United
States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961).
29 LEECH, OLIVER, & SWEENEY 139-5 1.
30 Id. 144.
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Goods and services always are produced and distributed by
individuals, in business groups or as state agents. The question is
the extent to which the state owned business agencies are immune from the jurisdiction of another state under international
law. Worthy of note is the departure from the Restatement in
favoring a delegation to courts rather than foreign offices for
determining such limitations. The authors explain their choice
by using foreign cases to show the value of an independent
domestic judiciary in the determination when immunity should
be granted.
The chapter omits any extensive historical prologue, moving
first to an examination of the absolute theory of immunity with
materials from English 3 l and Eastern European sources, 32 and
then to an analysis of the restrictive theory which subjects certain
commercial acts of state to foreign jurisdiction. Chosen as a focal
point is an exemplary case from Austria,3 3 which lays the
groundwork for an in-depth study of the pending United States
legislation codifying and extending the restrictive theory.3 4 The
Austrian decision uses the same objective standard for determining whether an act performed by a representative of a foreign
government is immune as the bill before Congress. The courts
must determine only that the act itself (irrespective of the governmental purpose for which the act is performed) is commercial in nature.35 Upon such a finding, there is no immunity.
The authors then trace the United States' policy on
36
sovereign immunity from the days of the famous Tate letter.
While the letter is evidence that the restrictive theory had been
adopted by the State Department to subject foreign states to
jurisdiction, state-owned assets could not be sold and the policy
itself was not always observed. Such failure is a consequence both
of placing the primary responsibility for determining the applicability of the doctrine in the Executive and of the courts'
31 Krajina v. The Tass Agency [1949] 2 All. E.R. 274; The Porto Alexandre [1920]
P.30 (C.A.); The Cristina [1938] A.C. 485.
32 Aldona S. v. United Kingdom, 90 Journal du Droit International 191 (1963) (Sup.
Ct. Poland 1948).
33 Collision with Foreign Government Owned Motor Car, 40 INT'L L. REP. 73 (1970)
(Sup. Ct., Austria 1961).
31 S. 566, introduced on January 22, 1973 and referred to the Committee on the
Judiciary. 119 CONG. REC. 1297 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1963). See H.R. 3493 and Hearings
on H.R. 3493 Before the Subcomm. on Claims and Governmental Relations of the House Comm.

on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 10 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
35 Collision with Foreign Government Owned Motor Car, 40 INT'L L. REP. 73 (1970)
(Sup. Ct., Austria 1961).
36 Letter from the legal adviser of the Department of State to the Department of
Justice, May 19, 1952. 26 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE BULL 984 (1952).
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perpetual abdication.3 7 The Executive, free from the binding
restraints of judicial precedent and plagued by endless pressures
on changing policy officers and legal advisers, is highly susceptible to decisions based less upon the policy of the Tate letter than
upon circumstances of the moment. While the Tate letter may
have appeared to express "unqualifiedly" a new and restrictive
State Department policy in 1952,38 in fact it reflects a serious
defect of process-a failure of trust that courts can handle the
limited concept to conclusion. The policy subsequent to the Tate
letter in effect is the same in process and meaning as it was
before. 3 9 States engaging in commercial activity are subject to
jurisdiction for the purpose of suit, but not for execution.
The chapter offers an interpretation of how the American
version of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity led to
present distortions and misconceptions of the original guidelines. It is a study requiring the use of civil law conceptions.40
The restrictive theory's origins are described as a natural outgrowth of the civil law distinctions between acts of individuals
done in the "public domain" and those within a "private domain." These distinctions, alien to the nature of one immersed
in the Anglo-American legal tradition, repeatedly have been
misinterpreted in the United States and have been reformulated in the far less encompassing differentiation between "public acts" and "commercial acts."' 4' The contributions of Dean
Sweeney in the development of this distinction and in the move
toward the restructuring of theory are well-known. The most
recent and belated attempt to make sense out of civil law distinctions modified by United States case law is the proposed legislation, drafted in the Legal Adviser's office, now before the Congress. American court decisions following the Tate letter are
incorporated into that proposal.

" R. LILLICH, THE PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 3-44 (1965). See also Dobrovir, A Gloss on the Tate Letter's Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity, 54 VA. L. REV. I
(1968); Comment, InternationalLaw: Sovereign Immunity: The First Decade of the Tate Letter
Policy, 60 MICH. L. REV. 1142 (1962); Note, The American Law of Sovereign Immunity Since
the Tate Letter, 4 VA. J. INT'L L. 75 (1964).
38
See Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 215
A.2d 864, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 822 (1966); LEECH, OLIVER, & SWEENEY 354-57.
a"R. LiLLICH, supra note 37, at 3-44.
40

The authors note with interest that "[i]t cannot be entirely an accident that states

whose courts led the development of the restrictive theory, or eventually adopted it, are

also, in the main, those where French administrative law was followed or acquired influence." LEECH, OLIVER, & SWEENEY 323. See casebook sections entitled "Relevance of
French Administrative Law Concepts," id.; "Reflection in the Restrictive Theory of
Civilian Concepts of Administrative Law," id. 324.
41Id. 336.
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Through comparative analysis within a functional setting,
two possible lines of development are examined in the materials.
The first is the natural extension of the chaotic situation presently exemplified by the Rich case 42 and a recent Fifth Circuit
decision. 43 These cases reflect complete judicial abdication in ruling upon suggestions of immunity, in deference to Department
of State recommendations. The authors are surely correct in
stressing that the Department's role, the relation to the courts,
and the political reality of the situation, account for our practical
inability to maintain the purity of the principles expressed in the
Tate letter. The Tate letter doctrine in effect has been replaced
by a case-by-case approach involving an "informal hearing" before the legal adviser's office. 44
The second possible line of development emphasizes the
role of the courts. While the current informal Department of
State procedures were established to aid in assessing the litigants'
positions when a foreign sovereign claimed immunity directly
through diplomatic channels, 45 such procedures are, at best, an
inferior substitute for fair opportunity for all litigants to be
heard in court.46 Whether or not the Department of State is
"singularly ill-equipped to render impartial decision on whether
a state should be granted immunity," the authors admit a policy
preference toward the elimination of any role for the Executive
in granting immunity.47 They agree with the conclusion of the
letter of transmittal accompanying the bill on sovereign immunity now pending before Congress, that "[a] transfer of this
function to the courts will also free the Department of State
from pressures by foreign states to suggest immunity .... Plaintiffs, the Department of State, and foreign states would thus
benefit from the removal of the issue of immunity from the
realm of discretion and making it ajusticiable question. 4 8
The sovereign immunity chapter, in promoting the codification of American law on sovereign immunity, adds a needed
42Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961). See also Note, International Law-Sovereign Immunity-The Last Straw in Judicial Abdication, 46 TUL. L. REV. 841
(1972).
43Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974). For background on the case, see
Rovine, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to InternationalLaw, 68 Am. J.
INT'L L. 309 (1974). See also Comment, Sovereign Immunity-The Case of the "Imias", 68
A,. J. INT'L L. 280 (1974). For documents, see 13 INT'L L. MATERIALS 120-63 (1974).

41See, Statement of Hon. Charles N. Brower, Acting Legal Adviser, Dept. of State, in
Hearings,
supra note 34, at 14-18.
4
5 Id.

46 LEECH, OLIVER, & SWEENEY 366.
47
48

Id. 367.
Id.
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perspective on domestic lawmaking involving international legal
questions. Yet an opportunity is missed: we are given no process
for proposing and appraising policy alternatives. Such alternatives must be constructed and are not exhausted in the legislative
proposal. Empirical, law-related research is required to determine whether decisions by courts will further a sound stability in
trade more than Executive discretion. What would the empirical
consequences be, for example, of the outright abolition of
sovereign immunity as a legal concept? A considerably less ambitious modification of the present system would be to create an
improved, formal hearing procedure within the Department of
State. While the list of such alternatives is limited, the inclusion
of additional options would aid the creative development of actions requiring far more than a knowledge of rules. A greater
emphasis upon alternative thinking would require skills of
analysis and synthesis of a highly sophisticated nature regarding
the international system, skills which we do not teach very well.
Law-related empirical research has not yet found firm roots in
law school programs of international law, although schools of
international affairs have succeeded in developing such competence. The evaluation of proposed alternatives for jurisdictional
immunities can provide an excellent starting point. But even in
its present form, the chapter is a vastly improved tool to spur
thinking about state immunity in its functional setting.
The material on the act of state doctrine, that courts defer
to the Executive when the validity of an act of a foreign state
done in its own territory is before a domestic court, is included
in the second of the two chapters concerning limitations on the
exercise of jurisdiction. It is a companion, the other side of the
coin, to state immunity. Analytically, the act of state doctrine is
not a limitation on jurisdiction to the nation-state; it is ajudicially
imposed domestic restraint which has force because it is an exercise of domestic jurisdiction. The chapter belongs where it is,
though, because most courts will not pass adverse judgments on
a public act of a foreign state, notwithstanding the existence of
jurisdiction, where to do so would require the balancing of a
foreign state's interest in, say, nationalization of foreign corporations and a principle of international law regarding fairness and
compensation in order 49to determine the validity of the official
act of the foreign state.

The underlying structure of the materials lets us see clearly
that domestic courts defer both to the Executive and to settle" R. FALK,
137 (1964).
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ment by negotiation in disputes about economic activities where
there is a question about the validation of an act of a foreign
state in its own jurisdiction. If the attention given to rights of
individuals is to be taken seriously, however, the courts should
not close their doors where human rights are violated, even if an
act of state is in question. The act of state doctrine should be
used as an analytic tool, as the line of demarcation between judicial deference to the diverse elements of economic regulation on
the one hand, and the protection of fundamental human rights
on the other.50 The struggle between these two powerful
forces-human dignity and economic efficiency-reappears in
many guises in the work.
IV.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY:
THE DIFFERENT STANDARDS

Professors Leech, Oliver, and Sweeney have derived two dis-

tinct branches from the law of state responsibility for injuries to
aliens: economic regulation and protection of human rights. The
first branch includes the rights and duties of business enterprises
as they are regulated under standards of international law. 51
The second covers the rights and duties of individuals under
52
international law.

The distinction between a process to regulate economic concerns and a process for individuals is not easily constructed. The
use of minimum standards of international law has to be reconciled with the need for social and economic development, and
hence with the need for equal treatment under national standards. Both sets of standards have emerged from the same body
of practice and decisions. Business entities and individuals traditionally have been viewed as having the same legal standing for
diplomatic protection by the countries to whom they owe allegiance of nationality. At the heart of the problem are three
issues. To what extent are states which are entitled to espouse
claims on behalf of business enterprises responsible for the activities of those enterprises? Similarly, should states hold their
individual nationals accountable for international crimes (and
how), as well as protect them from human rights deprivations?
Finally, is there a difference in standards for individuals and for

enterprises in function or process?

50 Id. 9-10. See also Laylin, JusticiableDisputes Involving Acts of State,'7 INT'L LAWYER

513 (1973).
51LEECH, OLIVER, & SWEENEY 480-518.
52 Id. 519-725.
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In sorting out the law of state responsibility into the two
functional branches, each drawing on broad material for both
rights and duties, the authors use standards of international law
to treat individuals and business enterprises differently. The
values protected, the law, and even the processes and institutions
for deciding the questions are different.
In the section on regulation of economic activities, the authors show that the interests of states are adjusted, with standards varying according to purpose. The function of economic
regulation is no longer the nineteenth century view of the liberal
state's protecting commercial enterprises against intrusions of
state power and prescribing international standards for reparation in case a state overstepped its bounds. The contemporary
function is the sharing of wealth as efficiently as possible and
allocating the risk of wealth loss. Whether the risk is allocated
through decentralized measures of self-help with 'just" compensation being the fiction for adjusting economic interests, through
divestment schedules, through lump-sum settlements, or
through a policy of nonespousal for all foreign nationalization
measures, the function of law is the same. The system of
economic regulation presented by the authors cuts through these
nineteenth century labels, but it does not go far enough either in
theory or in showing the value of empirical research to illuminate the policy preferences embodied in the functional analysis
of international economic regulation.
The implications of the Sabbatino decision, although strongly
disputed by international lawyers such as McDougal and Lillich,
support the authors' tacit preference for economic diversity and
negotiation among governments to regulate economic activity.
When diversity is preferred, the international law questions are
transferred to the political and economic level where interests
are accommodated by negotiation or market mechanisms. Questions of international law remain, but it is the proper role of the
domestic tribunal to defer deciding them. The Supreme Court's
decision in the First National City Bank case 53 might be interpreted to mean that deference to the standard of diversity and
market economics is not absolute, and might be relieved by a
letter from the Executive. A better doctrine would be to agree
with the absolute bar for economic questions suggested in
Brennan's dissent,5 4 but for the court itself to assert judicial
51First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972); see, e.g.,
Lowenfeld, Act of State and the Department of State, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 795-814 (1972).
5"First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 776 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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jurisdiction in human rights questions. The economic equilibrium required is not so easily adjusted by courts, and deference
tends to promote the integrity of the judicial system.
Judicial deference, however, does not always prove the best
course. It would not be inconsistent for the domestic courts to
refuse to defer when there is a question of fundamental human
rights at issue. A wide range of possible cases may present themselves in which a domestic court may be under a duty to prescribe minimum standards to a foreign state for treating an individual within its own jurisdiction, but as a practical matter,
minimum standards are more effectively applied in favor of individuals against their own governments.
Diversity in national social and economic policies is important for the promotion of international welfare and requires affirmative, not just negative, standards. The authors seem to take
issue with any distinction between "economic" and "noneconomic" human rights, which serves to reinforce the emphasis
on the welfare function. There are some aspects of economic
deprivations which can threaten values of individuals as conclusively as physical coercion. For example, in the two Bernstein
cases 55 it was clear that Nazi measures were directed against human beings through economic measures of extermination. Destroying a person's livelihood through economic measures such
as the confiscation of a family farm, raises a fundamental human rights question. It should be resolved by an international
minimum standard and not deferred to the Executive for negotiation. The problem is how to draw the line. The authors build
on an act of state and state responsibility framework to move
into a functional examination of both rights and responsibilities
of individuals and of enterprises in relation to states.
Others have made the same distinctions recently, with new
theoretical overtones. Roberto M. Unger argues that the rule of
law, which refers to a system of autonomous rules which are
administered impersonally and supported by the majority of
society, 56 is being rendered obsolete because the conditions that
produced it have changed. These conditions included the Euro55 Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Fr~res Socit6 Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947), where suit was brought to recover from an assignee property
allegedly taken by Nazi government because the plaintiff was Jewish. Bernstein v. N.V.
Nederlansche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappoj, 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949).
56 Dr. Unger, an assistant professor of law at Harvard University, expressed his
opinions during an "Evening Dialogue" held at the Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution, on June 27, 1974, in which the reviewer
participated. This dialogue dealt with the question, "Can the rule of law survive the
transformation of modern society?"
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pean liberal state, which arose by compromise between middle
class and king, and its unique combination of interest group
pluralism and transcendent religion, as opposed to the communal law which it displaced. Now this religious liberal state has
been replaced by a new corporate-welfare state, casting off its
claims of liberality. A liberal state is interested in protecting individuals against state interference with personal freedom or
economic activity. A corporate-welfare state is concerned with
affirmative goals for public welfare, such as the duty to provide
food, jobs, and economic security. The question is whether the
rule of law can survive in this new climate. After all, the act of
state doctrine itself is a means of protecting economic intervention to promote national welfare. When welfare on an international scale is also becoming a reality, we no longer have
the luxury of avoiding systematic thought about the international distribution of wealth and resources. Here again, empirical, law-related research and alternative thinking is required
of law schools purporting to teach international law in a contemporary world.
At the same time, jurisprudential questions arise about reconciling the communal and the transcendent with a notion of
law drawing on objective values shared by an interdependent
community process rather than a religious one. Alternatively, we
might return, in a circular fashion, to primitive law and reliance
on tribal norms of welfare by using customary international law.
Just how the transcendental and the immanent elements of
law are to be merged has long bothered philosophers. This problem is a crucial one for the academic community. I would suggest that it is impossible to achieve a doctrinal synthesis between
economic welfare through diverse state practices and universal
human rights. In this sense, I agree with the casebook's distinctions. However, there is room for both the immanent and the
transcendent within a process such as the authors propose. The
immanent element, the communal action of economics, seeks
cooperation and international welfare through the widest possible sharing of goods and services. The fundamental value of
human protection relies on the transcendent, which implies a
conflict model since individual liberty is always at odds with state
power being exercised for welfare. The immanent elements are
the affirmative, even ideological, sharing of wealth; the transcendent is the universal rule of law derived from denying
states the right to interfere with human dignity. Deference, in
form of the act of state doctrine or non-conflict models, may
be expected to achieve a utilitarian solution. The question is
whether international law can limit the powers of efficiency and

1975]

BOOK REVIEW

utilitarian egalitarianism when necessary to protect human
rights. I doubt it.
Using economic analysis, Robert Bork 57 and Richard
Posner 58 seem to have come to much the same conclusions. If
most law-related decisions are left to the economic marketplace,
including the political arenas, interests will be accommodated
through utilitarian negotiation in a cooperative process of self
interest adjusted by give and take. The only time the rule of law
should intercede universally is when there is a lack of sufficient
rational information about what the system is being required to
allocate. When basic human rights are at stake, however, law
(through the courts) should intervene. Domestically, this distinction may be feasible. Internationally, it is more difficult. Using
the international welfare model, when redistribution is needed
for human welfare, how can the process intervene to disrupt
efficient economic relationships providing food, jobs and security? What alternatives to an international legislative process
are there?
It may also be useful to look at processes which support the
functional differences between economic and human rights. On
the domestic side, there are numerous agencies which may participate in decisioniwuhen a citizen or corporation suffers deprivadons abroad, or an alien is injured in the United States. The
State Department legal adviser's office, the courts, the Office of
the Attorney General, congressional committees, and the states
themselves may be involved; the casebook provides ample exposure to such processes. The main recourse for an injured
American is to persuade the State Department, either directly or
by means of the agencies noted, to take up the matter diplomatically and negotiate a settlement. The process rests on the espousal theory of state responsibility: injury to an individual is an
injury to the state. 59 The inherent shortcoming of this fiction is
that it is the state, through its representatives, which decides
whether the state is injured. The individual or entity likewise is
faced with another procedural barrier, this one perhaps more
difficult than the first: he must show the exhaustion of local
remedies and the denial of justice in the country alleged to have
injured him. Individuals have greater need for protection, but
57 Solicitor General of the United States. Mr. Bork's views were also expressed at the
"Evening
Dialogue" at the Smithsonian, supra note 56.
58
See generally, R. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAv (1972).
-'9The decision whether to espouse a claim is entirely within the Department of

State. See R.
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seem to find greater frustration (except after settlement, when
they are preferred by absolute priority in getting paid). Again
the problem of reasonableness of classifying emerges as significant. On the economic front, it is perhaps easier to raise the
question in a domestic court favorable to a business enterprise,
but the effects of the sovereign immunity and act of state doctrines place barriers to recovery for an alleged wrong such as
wealth deprivations. The enterprise is expected to sustain a
greater risk of ultimate loss in the process, but it frequently
finds more ardent representation of its interest than do individual claimants.
At the central level, a functional system might be developed
which would provide remedies for classes in international law
disputes. Nation-states could allocate limited jurisdiction to international tribunals established to determine rights and duties
imposed upon individuals under international agreement, and
then enforce such judgments against individuals. An international criminal court for the prosecution of international criminal acts, for example, might try cases prosecuted by a state and
then turn convictions over to the state for enforcement purposes. The authors' structural treatment easily leads to such an
alternative proposal. Such a process might offer distinct advantages over national obligations for trial and enforcement of individual responsibilities, particularly in cases of terrorism, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity. The utility of direct access
lies in its creation of an institutional device to bring social and
political factors into the process at two points: in the general
jurisdiction of the tribunal, and in the procedures for deciding a
particular dispute.
Jurisdiction of an international tribunal over economic disputes in which individuals have direct standing may be conferred by international agreement for various purposes. 60 Most
common, and by far the easiest to negotiate, is the creation of a
tribunal to handle damage or injury claims after they have
arisen. The function of the tribunal is to compensate for international wrongs which the countries concerned agree ought to
be paid. Most often these direct access procedures have been
successful after vast economic disruptions-such as wars, territorial settlements, or nationalization.
Several attempts and much writing have sought the creation
of international claims tribunals to handle claims of individuals
60 1. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (1973). See also SUMMER
CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS: PROTECTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 66 (Cardozo ed. 1964) (5th Conference, Cornell Law

School).
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against governments. The old prize court proposal would have
let persons wronged by illegal captures of their vessels appeal
from the prize court proceeding in the first instance. Similarly,
the Central American Court of Justice consented generally to
hear suits by individuals against governments, provided local
remedies were exhausted. Sohn has explicitly spelled out a proposal for regional and special claims tribunals.6 1 Stone has argued for a less formal and cheaper kind of international court
for commercial matters similar to the old English Court of
Piedpoudre.6 2 He urged pluralization through the assize circuit
for small regional cases either by changing the International
Court of Justice statute or by creating other tribunals. Jencks
echoes the creation of international claims courts for individuals
to sue governments. 63 Numerous other proposals have been
heard, all the to same effect.
It is one thing for governments to consent to be sued internationally by injured persons who want direct remedies for previous wrongs. It is quite another to permit individuals to challenge the authority of a government, or a functional international community, to act to achieve some economic objective of
the community. The European Economic Community and the
Coal and Steel Community provide not just an international
claims forum for persons damaged in tort or contract by the
communities, but also a forum to review decisions of those communities affecting the interests of a real or juridical person. The
direct access procedure is not created after the economic disruption. Rather, it is created tQ anticipate economic conflicts and
displacements which the functional economic community causes
in its common quest to reduce trade barriers and tariffs, control
prices and cartels, and promote a common economic policy. The
procedure for the Court of Justice to review acts of the community's institutions permits a balancing of community, state
and individual interests. The InternationalLegal System has given a
superb perception of a legal system that will allow such creativity.
But it must go further itself in promoting a creative role for
international lawyers by suggesting methodologies by which
functional analysis can lead to sustained alternative thinking on
how new creations enter.

61 Sohn,

Proposals for the Establishment of a System of International Tribunals, in
63 (M. Domke ed. 1958).
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Conciliation No. 536, 1962).
63 C. JENCKS, THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND

(1958).
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V. THE NEXT STEP: INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION
In taking the book's analytic structure to its logical conclusion, my view is that its major contribution is to demonstrate that
individuals, as well as states and enterprises, are ultimately participants in the international law process. Whether the issue is
protecting or enforcing international human rights and duties,
or deciding functional or substantive economic disputes that
have reached the international level, we need a realistic conception and implementation of international jurisdiction. We need
to promote new central institutions, as well as to explain the role
of national and regional institutions in the legal order. We need
special jurisdiction for individuals, enterprises, and states in justiciable international cases. The allocation of international jurisdiction by functional treaties, to carve out a special limited process geared to special disputes with proper classes, is realistic.
The casebook readily builds the foundation for both realism and
creativity. Whether it be a trade dispute between the United
States and the Soviet Union settled through arbitration techniques, or a regional court such as the EEC, the defunct American Court of Justice, an international criminal court, or a mixed
claims tribunal, the process should consciously seek a demarcation between a justiciable question and that which is an economic
or political question. The process should allow individuals direct
access to invoke international law in their disputes before international tribunals in those proper cases. The lawmaking allocation of competence itself should be designed to accommodate
the inherent conflicts between market economy and human
rights among states, enterprises, and individuals. Jurisdiction
over subject matter should be allocated to an international tribunal only when its function and purpose is clear.
It is essential that the nation-state be removed from its position as paterfamilia in justiciable disputes between its citizenry
and other governments that are tied to functional purposes. Following the thesis of the casebook, it is possible to construct a
functional theory of international jurisdiction in which the rule
of law can be made directly applicable to the individual with the
state then being the enforcement agent. The law-creating function would be exercised by states. Economic disputes could be
negotiated to allocate risks of loss, using valuation theories 64 and
64 General principles such as "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation have
proved all too often to be of little utility-the real issue in most cases being not whether
compensation should be paid, but rather, the determination of the amount. The problem
of valuation is always the problem of the allocation of loss and the process of espousal is
the process by which the risk of loss is allocated. For a discussion concerning a policy
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divestment strategies, 65 but with international tribunals deciding
the applications. Until we begin to shape international jurisdiction and permit a rule of law directly available to individuals to
serve various functions and concrete purposes, as we have done
in federal jurisdiction, there will be no alternative to Unger's
pessimism about the meaning of the rule of law. If allegiance to
the nation-state is not enough for survival, it must-in limited
but important purposes-be transferred to a growing international rule of law. We have sufficient technique and instruments.
We lack only vision, ingenuity, and moral courage.
Our needs can be met if the functions for central adjudication are specific and based on mutual self-interest, allowing
limited jurisdiction. Disputes as to allocation of economic risks
thus could be removed to a nonpolitical international jurisdiction
instead of being left to the political organs. With such an arrangement, central international institutions could aid in the settlement of disputes under policies of the common global good,
rather than exacerbating them. The lawmaking force of treaty
would serve the self-interest of states by regulating processes of
risk allocation. Instead of negotiating state-to-state reparation
payments, to be distributed by national commissions (as is presently done), a settlement agreement could be transferred to an
international level, allowing governments and anyone else to defend suits brought by individual claimants within the narrow
scope of the treaty. The international tribunals would decide
only whether the individual or enterprise has a valid claim under
international law, as limited by the terms of the functional interoriented approach toward the valuation of foreign aid held enterprises, see Weigel &
Weston, Valuation upon the Deprivationof Foreign Enterprise:A Policy-OrientedApproach to the
Problem of Compensation Under InternationalLaw, in 1 THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED
PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-39 (R. Lillich ed. 1972). For the practice of the
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, see Lillich, The Valuation of Nationalized Property
by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, in id. 95-116. The search for guiding rules by
the International Court of Justice is discussed in White, The Problems of Valuation in the
Barcelona Traction Case, in id. 43-63. Payment of reparations can be done in a number of
ways, particularly when countries need to settle claims to permit more important trade
and economic agreements. One of these methods is "value tying," where payments to
private parties come from favorable trade agreements, extension of credit or reducing an
import barrier. Such payments, however, are not always passed onto the injured claimants. For a discussion of the French practice, see B. WESTON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS:
POSTWAR FRENCH PRACTICE 33, 119 (1971). See also I. FOIGHEL, NATIONALIZATION AND
COMPENSATION 111-19 (1964); R. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL CLAIIS: THEIR ADJUDICATION
BY NATIONAL COMMISSIONS

(1962).

65 Such strategies consist of arrangements permitting the transfer of new and exist-

ing foreign held investments to local ownership and control. For a survey of possible
divestment mechanisms, see A. HIRSCHMAN, How TO DIVEST IN LATIN AMERICA AND

WHY 11-22 (Essays in International Finance No. 76, 1969).
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national agreement, and award any amount to be drawn from
the previously negotiated lump-sum settlement. The law would
be invoked directly by central institutions.
The extension of legal process completes the tacit assumptions of the casebook, that international process requires allocation of functional jurisdiction to central institutions both in
economic and in human rights disputes. To survive changing
conditions, the law must be made applicable to individuals having disputes under the jurisdictional device, whether economic
or basic rights. Such development, engineered with the artistry
and skill of well-educated lawyers, would stand as a most significant and feasible advancement in the world order.
I have attempted to interpret this major casebook in international law by beginning with its own assumptions about functional decisions. While the work professes to put theory and
philosophy to a later priority, it surely rests inherently both on a
need for theory and on theoretical assumptions themselves. It
deserves high praise in freeing us for more contemporary inquiry less bound by the metaphysics of the past; yet it is subject
to fair criticism for failing to give us sustained guidance in any
theoretical methodologies to aid in the global process of decision
under study. Alternative thinking, empirical research, and the
use of the social sciences and humanities, need to be integrated
more in the materials if they are to sustain their claim to deal
with a legal system of global dimension. While the term itself
claims too much, it is necessary to begin to work toward realistic
global perspectives.
The context of the work requires understanding of forces
about which we do not enjoy thinking: violence, deprivation,
mass hunger, retaliation, and change in attitudes toward human
dignity and equality. My analysis of jurisdiction is an effort, in
agreement with the authors, to show how juridical concepts of
jurisdiction might better serve functional needs for orderly decisions than dealing from the concept of a nation-state. The book's
attempt to study the allocation of power to prescribe and enforce
rules before examining the state and its recognition is a worthy
beginning effort at constructing an unwritten world constitution,
at least in concept. It also corresponds to the conclusions of
thinkers such as Kelsen and McDougal who always ask how the
larger community ultimately allocates power and authority.
Equally important, however, are the limitations on this power
and authority which appear under various names such as "act of
state doctrine," "sovereign immunity," and "minimum standards
of international law." My point in analyzing these concepts from
the book's view is to show that important collisions are taking

1975]

BOOK REVIEW

1025

place between the economic analysts, who place utilitarian emphasis on the efficiency of the legal process, and the humanists,
who attempt to limit the egalitarianism of welfare when it sacrifices certain human rights. Even more troublesome are the
welfare duties which require states to take affirmative social and
economic action for their peoples. This welfare function of states
may also be incompatible with the liberal notion of a rule of law
meant to settle disputes about power in favor of liberty. The
authors deserve high praise for separating the economic enterprise from the human individual and in examining both rights
and duties for each, implying that the classifications require different juridical concepts.
The most serious criticism of the work lies in a common
failure of American law casebooks-the paucity of alternative
thinking or creativity regarding systematic proposals for change
and strategies for implementing such proposals. Such skills are
no less the common heritage of lawyers than knowing how decisions are made within the system, Creative images of hopeful but
realistic alternatives under international law are needed, requiring competence of an extraordinarily sensitive and skillful kind.
The conception of international jurisdiction under lawmaking
treaties, where individuals can bypass the state in agreed areas of
cases or controversies, is one possibility to which the casebook's
material leads. Especially in light of the authors' biases in favor
of the realistic, analytic mode of study with emphasis upon actual
decision, this next step of an international process for judicial
decision seems to flow logically, with the necessary obligation to
decide what are justiciable and what are political or economic
cases or controversies.
The authors have given us a new set of tools for teaching
these skills. On balance, they have given us something far more
valuable: a simple set of materials through whose structure and
purpose we shall see the world legal system differently. It is for
bringing international law closer to perceptions of present and
future realities that we owe Professors Leech, Oliver and
Sweeney our greatest debt.
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A Guide to Legislative Action. By
David Listokin. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University, 1974. Pp. 82. $5.00 paperbound.

EDUCATIONAL FINANCING REFORM:

THE EVOLUTION OF LAW IN THE BARRIOS OF CARACAS.

Kenneth L.

Karst, Audrey J. Schwartz & Murray L. Schwartz. Los
Angeles: Latin American Center, University of California,
1973. Pp. viii, 125.
FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS. By Wilbur L.
Fugate. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1973. Pp. xxv,
602. $35.00.
HOUSING DEVELOPMENT AND MUNICIPAL COSTS. By George Sternlieb. New Brunswick: Center for Urban Policy Research,

1973. Pp. xxvii, 378. $12.95.
Offenders and Victims. Edited by Terence P.
Thornberry & Edward Sagarin. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974. Pp. vii, 148. $12.50.
IMPEACHMENT: A Handbook. By Charles L. Black. New Haven &
London: Yale University Press, 1974. Pp. ix, 80. $7.95.
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: A Theoretical Overview. Second Edition. By William D. Coplin. Chicago: Rand
McNally, 1974. Pp. xx, 460. $8.95.
IMAGES OF CRIME:

AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS. Second

Edi-

tion. By Bernard F. Cataldo, Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., John

M. Stockton & Charles M. Weber. New York: John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., 1973. Pp. vii, 640. $13.95.
JUDICARE: Public Funds, Private Lawyers, and Poor People. By
S.J. Brakel. Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1974. Pp.
xi, 145. $3.50 paperbound.
JUST ABOUT EVERYBODY VS. HOWARD HUGHES. By David B. Tinnin. Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1973. Pp. xi, 462.

$10.00.
A Study of Military Law. By Joseph W.
Bishop, Jr. New York: Charterhouse Books, 1974. Pp. xvi,
241. $8.95.
THE KING'S PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND. By George 0. Sayles. New
York: W.W. Nortono Co., 1974. Pp. 164. $7.95 clothbound,
$2.95 paperbound.
LAND USE CONTROLS: Present Problems and Future Reform. Edited
by David Listokin. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Center for
Urban Policy Research, 1974. Pp. 398. $8.95.
LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA: Exemplified by 190 Ch'ing Dynasty Cases.
JUSTICE UNDER FIRE:

Translated from the Hsing-an hui-lan. 1st paperback. By

Derk Bodde & Clarence Morris. Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1974. Pp. xii, 615. $6.95 paperbound.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

A

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 123:1026

OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES, 17741970. By James W. Hurst. Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1973. Pp. xvii, 367. $9.50.
THE LEGAL POINT OF VIEW. By Robert A. Samek, New York:
Philosophical Library, 1974. Pp. xviii, 403. $15.00.
THE MARIHUANA CONVICTION: A History of Marihuana Prohibition
in the United States. By Richard J. Bonnie & Charles H.
Whitebread. Charlottesville, Va.: University of Virginia
Press, 1974. Pp. xiv, 368. $12.50.
JOHN MARSHALL: A Life in Law. By Leonard Baker. New York &
London: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1974. Pp. x, 845.
$17.95.
MODELS OF EMPLOYMENT AND RESIDENCE LOCATION. Edited by
Franklin J. James. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Center for
Urban Policy Research, 1974. Pp. 339. $8.95.
MONITORING COMPETITION: A Means of Regulating the Property and
Liability Insurance Business. By Robert E. Dineen, Jon S. Hanson, Michael B. Johnson. Milwaukee, Wisconsin: National
Association of Insurance Commissioners. Two volumes, pp.
767. $20.00 paperbound.
LEGAL HISTORY

MUNICIPAL NEEDS, SERVICES AND FINANCING:

Readings on Munici-

pal Expenditures. Edited by W. Patrick Beaton. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Center for Urban Policy Research, 1974.
Pp. 349. $8.95.
OUR AMERICAN LEVIATHAN UNBOUND: The Judicial Perversion of
American Freedom. By Robert L. Macey. Brooklyn, New York:
Theodore Gans' Sons, Inc., 1974. Pp. ix, 94. $5.00.
PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS: Before and After the Tax Reform Act of
1969. By Carolyn P. Chiechi & William H. Smith. Washington, D.C.: American Institute for Public Policy Research,
1974. Pp. 83. $3.00 paperbound.
PROPHETS WITH HONOR: Great Dissents and Great Dissenters in the
Supreme Court. By Alan Barth. New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1974. Pp. xxxvi, 254. $7.95.
PUBLIC COMPENSATION TO VICTIMS OF CRIME. By Herbert
Edelhertz & Gilbert Geis. New York: Praeger Publishers,
1974. Pp. xv, 309. $17.50.
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNIONISM: Structure, Growth, Policy. By Jack
Stieber. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1973.
Pp. xiv, 256. $7.95.
IN PURSUIT OF PRICE STABILITY:

The Wage-PriceFreeze of 1971. By

Arnold P. Weber. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1973. Pp. xii, 137. $2.50.
READINGS IN

URBAN ECONOMICS AND SPATIAL PATTERNS.

Edited

by Michael R. Greenberg. New Brunswick, New Jersey:
Center for Urban Policy Research, 1974. Pp. 328. $8.95.
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By Lewis G.
Mosburg, Jr. San Francisco: Real Estate Syndication Digest,
Inc., 1974. Pp. x, 266. $29.95.
REGULATING NEW DRUGS. Edited by Richard Landau. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1974. Pp. xi, 297. $5.25 paperbound.
REGULATION OF ADVERTISING BY THE FTC. By Richard A.
Posner. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research, 1973. Pp. 40. $3.00 paperbound.
RESIDENTIAL ABANDONMENT: The Tenement Landlord Revisited. By
Robert W. Burchell & George W. Sternlieb. New Brunswick:
Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers University,
1973. $15.00.
RIGHT TO EDUCATION: Anatomy of the Pennsylvania Case and Its
Implicationsfor Exceptional Children. By I. Ignacy Goldberg &
Leopold Lippman. New York: Teachers College Press,
1973. Pp. ix, 141. $7.00 clothbound, $3.50 paperbound.
ROUGH JUSTICE: Perspectives on Lower Criminal Courts. By John A.
Robertson. Boston & Toronto: Little, Brown & Co., 1974.
Pp. xxix, 533. $6.95 paperbound.
SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING?: Toward Legal Rightsfor Natural
Objects. By Christopher D. Stone. Los Altos, California: William Kaufmann, Inc., 1974. Pp. xvii, 102. $6.95 clothbound, $2.95 paperbound.
THE SHREVEPORT PLAN: An Experiment in the Delivery of Legal
Services. By R.R. Clifton, R.P. Hallaner & F. Raymond
Marks. Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1974. Pp. xii,
95. $4.00 paperbound.
SOCIAL CONFLICT: Readings in Rule Structures and Conflict
Relationships. By Philip Brickman. Lexington, Mass.: D.C.
Heath & Co., 1974. Pp. xiii, 529. $7.95.
SPACE ADRIFT: Landmark Preservationand the Marketplace. By John
L. Costonis. Urbana, Chicago, London: University olillinois
Press, 1974. Pp. xx, 207. $10.00.
A STILL AND WOVEN BLUE. By Richard Stookey. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1974. Pp. 334. $6.95.
REAL ESTATE SYNDICATE OFFERINGS & PRACTICE.

SUBURBANIZATION

DYNAMICS AND

THE FUTURE

OF THE CITY.

Edited by James W. Hughes. Rutgers, New Jersey: Center
for Urban Policy Research, 1974. Pp. 286. $8.95.
THE SUPREME COURT AND "POLITICAL QUESTIONS": A Study in
Judicial Evasion. By Phillippa Strum. University, Alabama:
University of Alabama Press, 1974. Pp. 180' $7.50.
WATERGATE AND THE LAW: Political Campaigns and Presidential
Power. By Ralph K. Winter, Jr. Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1974. Pp. 85.
$3.00 paperbound.
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POLITICS, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS. By Alexander
M. Bickel, Charles S. Hyneman, Richard M. Scammon,
Harry H. Wellington, Aaron Wildausky, James Q. Wilson &
Ralph K. Winter, Jr. Washington, D.C.: American Institute
for Public Policy Research, 1974. Pp. 89. $2.00 paperbound.
THE WHITEHOUSE TRANSCRIPTS: Submission of Recorded Presidential Conversations to the Committee on the Judiciary of the House
of Representatives by PresidentRichard Nixon. Edited by Gerald
Gold. Toronto, New York, London: Bantam Books, May
1974. Pp. viii, 877. $2.50 paperbound.
WATERGATE,

